Adaptability
How can rules evolve with the technology without creating arbitrary authority, regulatory capture, or permanent incumbent advantage?
The pacing problem meets capture risk: rules slow enough to be legitimate are too slow to be relevant. Regulatory markets — licensed private regulators competing on outcomes — are one attempt to square it.
View on the map → · Open in Browse →
What changed
01
The year ran two live experiments in updating AI law. The EU renegotiated its AI Act deadlines under industry pressure and — on the insider account — kept the changes targeted rather than hollowing it out. The US preemption fight produced its clearest institutional proposals yet: government-certified private verifiers auditing labs against their own frameworks, and a FINRA-style supervised self-regulatory organization designed against capture. Meanwhile the states kept converging bottom-up, the direct counterpoint to the patchwork thesis.
Recent thinking
Laura Caroli · TechPolicy.Press · 8 May 2026 essay
What the EU AI Omnibus Deal Changes for the AI Act and What Lies Aheadnegotiators managed — just barely, at the finish line — to conclude it quickly enough to replace the August 2, 2026 deadline in time, and to keep the changes relatively targeted.
Authoritative insider account (Caroli negotiated the AI Act) of the omnibus renegotiation — deadlines deferred, obligations trimmed, core requirements preserved — the central 2026 case study of revising a landmark AI law under industry pressure.
Dean W. Ball · Hyperdimensional · 15 Jan 2026 essay
The AI Patchwork EmergesYou cannot preempt all of these laws piece-by-piece; broad-based preemption of some kind is essential, and anyone who pretends otherwise is simply not engaging with the reality on the ground.
The strongest statement of the pro-preemption side: documents the accelerating, incoherent state patchwork and argues only broad federal preemption keeps AI rules coherent — the frame the rest of the year's debate responded to.
Dean W. Ball · Hyperdimensional · 26 Jun 2026 essay
What Should Be DoneIt would be good for someone to thoroughly audit the frontier labs at least to test their adherence to their own safety plans
Ball's positive program: government-certified private verification bodies auditing labs against their own safety frameworks — a revival of the regulatory-markets idea, argued as the only oversight design fast and expert enough to track the frontier.
Mark Thomas · Lawfare · 30 Jul 2026 essay
Designing a FINRA for Frontier AIA supervised self-regulatory organization (SRO), like FINRA, is a private industry body that writes and enforces rules for that industry, under the supervision of a government agency.
Detailed institutional design for a supervised SRO for frontier AI — mandatory membership, industry funding via compute assessments, majority non-industry board — squarely addressing how rules evolve with the technology while building in anti-capture safeguards.
Alasdair Phillips-Robins & Scott Singer · Carnegie Endowment · 5 Feb 2026 essay
With the RAISE Act, New York Aligns With California on Frontier AI LawsBoth bills create a core set of transparency requirements, mandating developers to publish frontier AI risk frameworks and report safety incidents to state officials.
Evidence against the patchwork thesis: New York deliberately converged on California's SB 53 template, suggesting states can harmonize frontier AI rules bottom-up without federal preemption.
Additional relevant discussion (5)
Foundational reading (2)
Regulatory Markets for AI SafetyClark & Hadfield · 2020The General-Purpose AI Code of PracticeEuropean Commission · 2025