The Biggest Questions About AI
The map · 4 Power · 4.1 Regulatory design · 4.1.3

Ex ante versus ex post

When is predeployment approval justified, and when is liability after harm sufficient?

Liability regimes can price risk without an approval bureaucracy — Weil's case for tort law as AI governance — but catastrophic and irreversible harms break the ex post logic: no one can be made whole afterward.

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What changed
April–August 2026 · swept August 3, 2026 · editorial review pending
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The US acquired a de facto ex-ante regime without legislating one: the June executive order's 30-day 'voluntary' pre-release security review is, on Zvi's reading, mandatory licensing in all but name. The scholarship sharpened on both sides — Ramakrishnan shows tort liability can perversely deter developers from investigating and disclosing novel risks, concluding ex-ante oversight is needed, while Weil extends his strict-liability case through abnormally-dangerous-activity doctrine.

Recent thinking
4 featured from 6 tracked · April–August 2026 · all 6 chronologically →
Ketan Ramakrishnan · SSRN · 25 Jun 2026 paper
Tort Law at the Frontier of Artificial Intelligence
it is largely the common law of torts - our society's most ancient and general legal mechanism for governing serious risks of physical injury - that will govern the frontier of AI development.

Major scholarly treatment of tort as the default frontier-AI governor: defends negligence doctrine's flexibility but shows liability can perversely deter developers from investigating and disclosing novel risks — concluding ex ante regulatory oversight is urgently needed.

Gabriel Weil · SSRN · 20 Apr 2026 paper
Abnormally Dangerous Algorithms: The Case for Strict Liability at the AI Frontier
many serious AI harms arise from residual, hard-to-eliminate risks rather than from readily provable negligence.

Weil's most developed statement since his canonical tort paper: severe third-party harms from misaligned agentic AI warrant strict liability, via abnormally-dangerous-activity doctrine or adapted vicarious liability.

Zvi Mowshowitz · Don't Worry About the Vase · 3 Jun 2026 essay
Trump Signs Executive Order For AI Testing Prior To Frontier Model Releases
Make no mistake. This is a de facto mandatory governmental licensing, preclearance and permitting requirement.

The sharpest analysis of the June executive order's 30-day 'voluntary' pre-release security review: the US has slid into ex ante approval for frontier models without legislation or the word 'licensing' — with the discretion and abuse risks that implies.

Shakeel Hashim & Celia Ford · Transformer · 15 May 2026 news
Is OpenAI changing its tune on AI laws?
We want to be very clear: we do not support the liability safe harbor included in SB 3444.

Reports the Illinois fight over compliance-based liability safe harbors — the live legislative test of whether ex post liability gets traded away for ex ante compliance regimes.

Additional relevant discussion (2)
The Insurability Frontier of AI Risk — Leung, Zhang, Ling, Toyoda & Loh · arXiv · 12 Jun 2026
The least bad way to regulate AI? — Tyler Cowen · Marginal Revolution · 27 Aug 2026
Foundational reading (4)Tort Law as a Tool for Mitigating Catastrophic Risk from AIGabriel Weil · 2024The Limits of LiabilityGabriel Weil, Institute for Law & AI · 2024Governing AI AgentsNoam Kolt, Notre Dame Law Review · 2025AI Liability Along the Value ChainBotero Arcila, Mozilla · 2025
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