Desirable end state

The core of both types of successionism is the idea that moral value is something abstract and divorced from anything as worldly or parochial as an ape-descended hominid.

The sharpest 2026 dissection of 'successionism': distinguishes control successionism (AI should decide) from experiential successionism (AI should replace us as the morally relevant beings) and traces both to a neo-Pythagorean view of value.

those ideas may spread, regardless of their long-term utility for humans or truth value.

Argues successionist ideologies gain ground not because true but because they resolve the cognitive dissonance of the people building AI — a memetic-evolution account of why replacement narratives are becoming culturally successful.

The question of what we should actually be aiming for has received comparatively little attention.

Organizes the scattered field of positive post-AGI visions into clusters — abundance, liberal pluralism, waypoints, cosmic bargains, preference extrapolation — arguing far more effort goes into what to avoid than what to aim for.

We could go down the path of centralized control but we don't have to do so.

Rejects the premise that superintelligence requires centralized control, arguing for a decentralized, personal-computing-style distribution of AI power as the preferable end-state — a value choice framed against the concentration discourse.

Personally, I would immediately say no

Catalogs the roughly five justifications AI successionists offer for accepting human extinction given a worthy successor, and argues for engaging them seriously rather than dismissing — a measured map of the pro-replacement position.